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(1) 
CASE NOTE 
“KNOCK, LISTEN, THEN BREAK THE DOOR DOWN”?  
THE POLICE-CREATED EXIGENCY DOCTRINE AFTER  
KENTUCKY v. KING  
RACHEL LEVICK† 
In an effort to curtail the excesses of the general warrant1 and to 
protect Americans and their private property,2 the authors of the Bill 
of Rights in the Fourth Amendment conditioned the issuance of war-
rants on the presence of probable cause.3 Though this language has 
been construed to require such a warrant for most searches of the 
home,4 the Supreme Court has identified several exceptions to this 
rule, including the “exigent circumstances” exception. Where “the 
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment,” a warrantless search is constitutional.5 In an 
 
† Senior Editor, Volume 161, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 
2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2010, University of Pennsylvania. My 
most sincere thanks to D. Benjamin Thomas and Erin Borek for their diligent work in 
preparing this piece for publication, and to David Dorey for his guidance, insight, and 
assistance during the writing process. 
1 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“[I]ndiscriminate searches and 
seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils 
that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
2 See id. at 585 (“The simple language of the Amendment applies equally to seizures 
of persons and to seizures of property.”). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4 See e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978)(“[W]arrents are generally 
required to search a person’s home or his person . . . .”). 
5 Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has identified 
several such exigencies, including the need to provide emergency medical aid, the “hot 
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, and the prevention of imminent destruction of evidence. 
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
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effort to clarify the boundaries of the exigent circumstances exception 
and to protect Fourth Amendment interests, several federal courts of 
appeals have held that the police cannot create an exigency and sub-
sequently use it to justify a warrantless entry.6 In order to determine if 
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred in such a case, these 
courts have relied on a variety of tests.7  
In Kentucky v. King, the Supreme Court sought to reconcile the 
“welter of tests”8 articulated by the lower courts and to craft a uniform 
approach to police-created exigencies.9 The Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether the exigent circumstances exception applies “when 
police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their 
presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.”10 Re-
versing the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the Supreme Court found 
that where “the police d[o] not create the exigency by engaging or 
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth  
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence 
is reasonable and thus allowed.”11  
This ruling aligns with both the Court’s precedent and the motiva-
tions underlying the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court’s 
 
6 See United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 2006) (declaring a warrant-
less search invalid because the arresting officers impermissibly created exigency in en-
tering the defendant’s hotel room); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 591 (5th Cir. 
2004) (permitting a warrantless search where there was no evidence that the officers 
intentionally created the exigency); United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1254 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (recognizing that police may not create an exigency to justify a forced war-
rantless entry); United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that an exigency that supports warrantless entry “cannot be created by police offic-
ers”); United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that 
police may not intentionally create an exigency to justify a warrantless entry into a pri-
vate dwelling); United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 804 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[E]xigent 
circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances 
are created by government officials . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United 
States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The agents cannot justify their 
search on the basis of exigent circumstances of their own making.”).  
7 See, e.g., United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2008) (using a 
reasonable foreseeability test); United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 565 (6th Cir. 
2005) (endorsing a probable cause and time to secure a warrant test); Gould, 364 F.3d 
at 591 (relying on a standard or good investigative tactics test); King v. Commonwealth, 
302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2010) (adopting a bad faith intent test).  
8 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011). 
9 See id. at 1858-63 (considering alternate proposals and selecting a rule that was 
consistent with precedent and provided protection for Fourth Amendment rights). 
10 Id. at 1854.  
11 Id. at 1858.  
Levick.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  9/20/2012 1:19 PM 
2012] “Knock, Listen, Then Break the Door Down”? 3 
 
test leaves some important questions unanswered, and the lower courts 
applying King will be forced to further develop the exigency exception 
to ensure that citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights are protected. 
I. KENTUCKY V. KING: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of King illustrate the challenges faced by law enforce-
ment officials and the threats posed to police suspects’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. On the night in question, Officer Gibbons, an un-
dercover officer in Lexington, Kentucky, executed a controlled buy of 
crack cocaine.12 After the exchange, Officer Gibbons instructed several 
officers to pursue the suspect into the breezeway of a nearby apart-
ment building.13 Upon entering the breezeway, the responding officers 
detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana and heard a door shut 
somewhere in the breezeway.14 The officers concluded that the odor 
was emanating from the back left apartment. Although Officer Gibbons 
radioed that he witnessed the suspect enter the back right apartment, 
the pursuing officers did not hear Officer Gibbons as they had already 
exited their vehicles.15  
The officers then knocked on the back left door “as loud as [they] 
could” and announced “[t]his is the police,” or “[p]olice, police, po-
lice.”16 After knocking on the door, the officers heard objects being 
moved somewhere inside the apartment.17 Fearful that drug-related 
evidence was going to be destroyed, the officers shouted that they 
“were going to make entry inside the apartment.”18 One of these offic-
ers, Officer Cobb then kicked the door open and entered the back left 
apartment.19 The police detained the three occupants of the apart-
ment, including King, and although the original suspect had entered a 
different apartment, they nonetheless discovered and confiscated co-
caine, cash, and drug paraphernalia lying in plain view.20  
 
12 Id. at 1854. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1854. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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At trial, King moved to suppress the evidence obtained during this 
warrantless search.21 The state trial court denied his motion, reasoning 
that the police entry was justified by the exigent circumstances of the 
imminent destruction of evidence.22 King then entered a conditional 
guilty plea for trafficking in a controlled substance and other  
crimes.23 He was sentenced to eleven years in prison, and the Kentucky  
Court of Appeals affirmed.24 
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, determining that the of-
ficers had impermissibly created the exigent circumstances which led 
to the warrantless search and ultimately to King’s conviction.25 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court set forth a two-part test based on 
bad faith and reasonable foreseeability for identifying a police-created 
exigency.26 Applying the test to King’s case, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court found that, though there was no evidence of bad faith, the po-
lice could have reasonably foreseen that their actions would spur the 
defendants to destroy evidence, and therefore, that the police search 
violated the Fourth Amendment.27 The Court granted King’s motion 
to suppress and vacated his conviction.28 
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.29 Writing for the eight-
Justice majority, Justice Alito rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
reasoning and adopted the Court’s preferred rule, stating that police 
officers cannot rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement when they created the exigency by “engaging  
or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth  
 
21 Id. at 1855. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Ky. 2010). 
26 See id. at 656. The court first held that police could not “deliberately create[] the 
exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement.” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004)). The court then 
explained that even absent bad faith, police may not rely on exigent circumstances if 
it “was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police 
would create the exigent circumstances.” Id. (quoting Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d  
826, 834 (Ark. 2004)). 
27 See King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d at 656-57. 
28 Id. at 657.  
29 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864.  
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Amendment.”30 The Court grounded its test in reasonableness,31 the 
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,”32 and two analogous areas of 
Fourth Amendment law that permit warrantless searches—the plain 
view exception33 and consent-based encounters.34 
The Court then discussed and rejected four other tests developed 
by the lower courts.35 First, the Court rejected the Kentucky Supreme 
Court’s “bad faith” test—which asks whether an officer attempted to 
circumvent the warrant requirement36—stating that the Court had re-
peatedly declined to adopt tests based on subjective intent.37 The 
Court similarly refused to implement a reasonable foreseeability test, 
which focuses on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that an  
 
30 Id. at 1858.  
31 Id. (“[W]arrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reason-
able, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant re-
quirement. Therefore, . . . the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search 
when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.”).  
32 Id. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
33 See id. at 1858 (“[W]e have held that law enforcement officers may seize evidence 
in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving 
at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made.”). 
34 See id. (“[O]fficers may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present 
in the place where the consensual encounter occurs.”). These analogies have been 
criticized as irrelevant to the facts of King and ignorant of the special protection afford-
ed to homes under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & 
SEIZURE § 6.5 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2011) (“[N]either [analogy] is particularly relevant to 
. . . King, where the logical starting point is that homes are entitled to ‘special protec-
tion . . . .’” (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006))); id. (explaining 
that when dealing with home searches, the Court practices a “rather strict application 
of the fundamental rule that ‘whenever practical [sic], [the police must] obtain ad-
vance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedures.’” 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))). However, these criticisms ignore the 
purpose for which the exigent circumstances exception itself was created: in certain 
instances, where an emergency has presented itself, a warrantless search of a home may 
be “objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” irrespective of the special 
protections afforded to the home. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). The 
Court’s analogies demonstrate the validity of the officer’s actions prior to the alleged 
Fourth Amendment violation and illustrate that the Court’s rule is consistent with its 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
35 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859-1861.  
36 Id. at 1859. 
37 See id. (explaining that an officer’s motives never invalidate an otherwise valid 
search and citing precedent to that effect). Supreme Court precedent supports the 
rejection of the bad faith test. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) 
(“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual 
officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] ac-
tion.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978))). 
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officer’s action would create an exigency, such as the imminent de-
struction of evidence.38 The Court found this test unpredictable and 
unclear,39 explaining that it would be difficult to apply, given that law 
enforcement officers must make split-second decisions in the field and  
judges would be forced to determine reasonableness “based on what the  
officers knew at the time.”40  
The Court also dismissed a test that asks whether police engaged 
in a warrantless search despite having probable cause and time to se-
cure a warrant.41 The Court found that this test “unjustifiably interferes 
with legitimate law enforcement strategies,” because “law enforcement 
officers are under no constitutional duty to halt a criminal investiga-
tion the moment they have minimum evidence to establish probable 
cause.”42 Finally, the Court rejected a test that considers whether police 
had engaged in standard or good investigative tactics, on the ground 
that such an inquiry “fails to provide clear guidance for law enforce-
ment officers and authorizes courts to make judgments on matters 
that are the province of those who are responsible for federal and state 
law enforcement agencies.”43  
The Court then applied its preferred standard to the facts of the 
case, and finding no Fourth Amendment violation, reversed the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court’s suppression of the evidence.44 The Court con-
cluded that the officers’ actions, including banging on the door and 
announcing their presence, were “entirely consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment,” and found “no other evidence that might show that the 
officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so.”45 
III. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENT: “KNOCK, LISTEN, THEN BREAK THE 
DOOR DOWN” 
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the majority, arguing that police 
officers would manipulate this new standard in an attempt to circum-
vent the warrant requirement.46 In her view, law enforcement officers 
 
38 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859-60. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1860. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1860-61 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). 
43 Id. at 1861.  
44 Id. at 1863. 
45 Id.  
46 See id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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could “now knock, listen, then break the door down, nevermind that 
they had ample time to obtain a warrant.”47 The Court’s new test would 
not only permit but also incentivize police officers to go door-to-door, 
pounding loudly and announcing their presence, and “on hearing 
sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evi-
dence of unlawful activity.”48  
Justice Ginsburg advocated for the probable cause and time to  
secure a warrant test instead, arguing that the majority’s test “arms the 
police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s  
warrant requirement in drug cases.”49 Under Justice Ginsburg’s  
alternative rule, the exigencies “must exist . . . when the police come 
on the scene, not subsequent to their arrival, prompted by their own 
conduct.”50 Because the police in King had ample time to secure a war-
rant yet failed to do so, Justice Ginsburg would have found a  
Fourth Amendment violation.51 
Justice Ginsburg’s proposed rule is appealing because it recognizes 
the possibility of police abuse or manipulation in justifying intrusions 
into private homes, the “chief evil against which . . . the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.”52 However, Justice Ginsburg failed to ade-
quately respond to the majority’s concern that her rule would limit 
police autonomy and effectiveness. As the majority pointed out, good 
legal reasons exist for rejecting Justice Ginsburg’s preferred test.53 In 
addition, members of the Court asked questions at oral argument that 
echoed Justice Ginsburg’s concerns,54 and the Court apparently found 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1865.  
49 Id. at 1864. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1866 (claiming that “securing a warrant was entirely feasible in this case”). 
52 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
53 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860-61 (stating that Justice Ginsburg’s test unreasonably 
interferes with law enforcement tactics). 
54 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 
(2011) (No. 09-1272) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[H]ow does this holding by us not become a 
simple warrantless entry in any drug case?”); id. at 19 (Sotomayor, J.) (“[D]oes a ruling 
in this case that any lawful conduct by the police mean that the police knock, some-
body gets up on the other side and . . . closes a door in the back, and police say, ‘In my 
experience it’s . . . consistent with the destruction of property . . . .’”); id. at 24 (Breyer, 
J.) (“[W]hat we’re trying to rule out is . . . they get this bright idea, the police: We’ll go 
knock at every door.”); id. at 52 (Kagan, J.) ( “[T]he concern here is that your test is 
going to enable the police to penetrate the home . . . without a warrant . . . in a very 
wide variety of cases, that all police really have to say is: We saw pot, we heard noise.”). 
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that the risk of police abuse were not sufficient to reject the test the 
Court ultimately adopted.  
Despite the Court’s rejection of Justice Ginsburg’s test, there are 
strong arguments in its favor. First, police can, in Justice Ginsburg’s 
view of the King doctrine, simply “knock, listen, then break the door 
down.”55 King has reduced the circumstances in which warrantless 
searches will result in the suppression of evidence, and this allows—or 
perhaps, encourages—police to test the limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment more frequently which in turn will increase the number of un-
lawful invasions by police Those who are victims of these type of 
Fourth Amendment violations are left in a “remedial gap” in which 
they can “recover from neither the officer nor the government.”56 Al-
ternatively, defendants guilty of criminal conduct sometimes receive a 
“get-out-of-jail-free” card in the form of the suppression remedy.57 In 
other words, under the current Fourth Amendment remedial scheme, 
“[c]riminals go free, while honest citizens are intruded upon in outra-
geous ways with little or no real remedy.”58  
Whether Justice Ginsburg’s prediction of increased police miscon-
duct will materialize depends on how the Supreme Court and lower 
courts construe the King doctrine in response to two issues: “exactly 
how . . . the line [is] to be drawn between permissible and impermissi-
ble police conduct potentially creating exigent circumstances,” and 
“assuming permissible conduct, how convincing must the evidence be 
that exigent circumstances, in the form of a risk of loss of evidence, 
are present.”59 If the lower courts continue to effectively develop the 
police created exigency doctrine by correctly applying the King rule,60 
Justice Ginsburg’s fears will likely never be realized.  
IV. APPLYING KING: ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM 
The Supreme Court chose the best test among those developed by 
lower courts. While it was the narrowest of the possibilities available to 
 
55 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
56 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 812 (1994). 
57 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (explaining the high costs  
of the exclusionary rule). 
58 Amar, supra note 56, at 758. 
59 LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 
60 See cases cited infra notes 62-63, 67-68 75-77. 
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the Court,61 the lower courts have had little difficulty utilizing the 
Court’s test in factual circumstances similar to those of King, where 
police anticipated the imminent destruction of evidence and entered a 
residence without a warrant,62 and have even applied the rule to dis-
similar fact patterns. For example, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, fol-
lowing King’s reasoning, found exigency based on officer safety, 
analogizing a threat to officer safety to the risk of the destruction of 
evidence in King.63 Most importantly, the lower courts have applied 
King’s reasoning without falling into the traps envisioned by Justice 
Ginsburg and other critics.64 
 
61 LAFAVE, supra note 34 (“The Supreme Court . . . adopt[ed] from the ‘welter of 
tests’ devised by lower courts the one providing by far the narrowest exception to the 
exigent circumstances rule . . . .”). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 443 F. App’x 806, 808 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curi-
am) (finding no police-created exigency where the defendant saw and fled from police, 
the defendant agreed to exit the apartment but failed to do so, and police “believed 
immediate entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence”); United States 
v. Hoskins, No. 10-20677, 2011 WL 4062307, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2011) (finding 
no police-created exigency where drug trafficker was using a cell phone at time of ar-
rest, and detectives feared he “was arranging for an associate to destroy evidence at his 
residence before a search warrant could be obtained”); United States v. Franklin, No. 
5:11-CR-42-KKC, 2011 WL 5827605, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Aug 31, 2011) (finding no police-
created exigency where police entered defendant’s backyard without a warrant after 
tracking him for more than an hour); Fulton v. State, No. 27A02-1101-CR-132, 2011 WL 
3847082, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (finding no 
police-created exigency where police sought a “knock-and-talk” to ascertain the where-
abouts of a suspect but heard increased commotion inside the apartment and someone 
yell to “flush” something); State v. Wood, No. COA10-372, 2011 WL 3891357, at *2-5 
(N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (holding that there was no 
police-created exigency where police received tip that defendant was dealing drugs at a 
hotel, the defendant’s girlfriend “began to come unraveled and physically shaken” 
when speaking with police, and police heard a door slam when approaching  
defendant’s hotel room). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 453 F. App’x 401, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (finding no constitutional violation where police looked through a broken 
window and observed a suspect with cocaine base as well as a gun, and the suspect 
pointed the firearm toward the door on which police had knocked); United States v. 
Montanya, 425 F. App’x 392, 393 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding no constitu-
tional violation when police officers searched a house without a warrant after observing 
a known narcotics trafficker engage in an apparent drug deal and then throw a weapon 
under the car when they approached him); see also People v. Torrez, No. H036145, 
2011 WL 3654453, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011) (finding no police-created exi-
gency where police were responding to a domestic violence call, heard loud noises 
inside the house, and a male spoke to police through the door but  
refused them entry). 
64 See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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A. Does King Tempt Courts to Excuse Unconstitutional Conduct? 
One critic of King has expressed concern that a two-step analysis—
in which the reviewing court first determines whether an exigency ex-
isted, and then decides whether the police inappropriately created 
some or all of that exigency—will lead judges to excuse police miscon-
duct.65 Since a judge will have already affirmed that an exigency exist-
ed, the reasoning goes, the judge may be hesitant to invalidate the 
search on the ground that police conduct may have contributed to 
that exigency.66 But the lower court decisions in the wake of King have 
not inappropriately excused police misconduct. In fact, courts have 
not hesitated to suppress evidence gathered following a police-created 
exigency.67 For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals suppressed the 
fruits of a warrantless search where, “[u]nlike the circumstances in 
King, in which the officers testified that . . . they could hear people 
moving things within the apartment,” there was no evidence before 
the court that “the officers heard any noise or made any other observa-
tions suggesting the imminent destruction of evidence.”68 Accordingly, 
because the occupant of the premises chose not to answer the door 
but officers nevertheless threatened to enter, the court found that the 
officer’s threat was “not reasonable conduct under the Fourth 
Amendment and was therefore unlawful.”69 As a result, the court sup-
pressed the evidence gathered through the unconstitutional search.70  
 
65 See The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 211, 220 
(2011) (arguing that a one-step test avoids the structural bias against criminal defend-
ants that a two-step test would engender). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153-54 (D. Or. 2011) 
(finding that the police-created exigency was a Fourth Amendment violation where the 
officer peered through a window without a “specific, particularized basis for believing 
that a crime had been committed, that his safety was threatened, or that evidence was 
being destroyed,” and only on the basis of what he saw, executed a search); State v. 
Walker, No. A-4672-08T1, 2011 WL 2535295, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28, 
2011) (per curiam) (finding police-created exigency where defendant opened his door 
while smoking a marijuana cigarette, and upon seeing a badge hanging around the 
officer’s neck, ran into his apartment, prompting police to follow). Cf. State v. Young, 
2d Dist. No. 24537, 2011-Ohio-4875, ¶ 52 (Froelich, J., dissenting) (“[T]here was no 
King justification to look for drugs or the destruction of evidence. In this case, a search 
(albeit designated as a sweep) has been bootstrapped from a mother’s calling the police 
with a complaint that her son continues to argue with her and keeps her up all night.”). 
68 State v. Aguilar, 267 P.3d 1193, 1196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).  
69 Id. at 1197.  
70 Id.  
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This decision is consistent with King’s recognition that occupants 
have no obligation to open the door to police who request entry with-
out a warrant.71 Furthermore, decisions such as this one protect the 
rights of citizens against the type of unlawful home entry Justice Gins-
burg feared. To avoid the risk that police will “knock, listen, then 
break the door down,”72 citizens in their homes need only to “stand  
on their constitutional rights”73 and decline to respond to police  
questions or requests for entry.  
Of course, there is a risk that an overly zealous police officer could 
interpret any noise emanating from a targeted residence—including 
those caused by everyday activities—as indicative of an exigency. How-
ever, discerning whether sounds are consistent with an exigency is a 
fact-bound inquiry that is the province of the trial court.74 When police 
violate Fourth Amendment rights on the basis of pseudo-exigencies, 
courts applying King have been, and must continue to be, swift to  
invalidate the search. Vigilance in this regard is a necessary corollary  
to the permissiveness of the King rule, and provides an answer to  
Justice Ginsburg’s concerns.  
Like the Arizona Court of Appeals, other courts have rejected war-
rantless entries where only a possible exigency existed. For example, the 
Iowa Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search following the 
arrest of a drug trafficking suspect because “the record [did] not sup-
port an inference that drugs were likely to be destroyed . . . . [h]ence, 
there was no reasonable fear that evidence would be lost during the 
time necessary to obtain a warrant.”75 Though the officer claimed he 
thought someone else in the apartment might destroy evidence, the 
court rejected this justification in the absence of any supporting evi-
dence.76 These decisions, and others like them, show that lower courts 
 
71 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (“[W]hether the person who 
knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private 
citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak.”). 
72 Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
73 Id. at 1862 (majority opinion).  
74 See id. at 1863 (“Any question about whether an exigency actually existed is better 
addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand.”). 
75 State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 851-52 (Iowa 2011) (citing King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854). 
76 See id. at 851 (reasoning that “nothing indicated another individual might be po-
tentially inside the apartment”). The court nevertheless affirmed the defendant’s  
convictions because the evidence was procured during a later search pursuant to a  
valid warrant. Id. at 856. 
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applying King are willing to invalidate improper entries on a case-by-
case basis if the facts show that police committed misconduct. 
It is true that a few lower courts have authored questionable King 
analyses and have justified possible police exploitation. In United States 
v. Alba, police entered a residence pursuant to a valid warrant, but re-
alized after entry that the warrant listed, and they had entered, the 
incorrect residence.77 After receiving directions to the correct house 
from another agent, the police entered without a warrant,78 “based on 
the need to protect the agents from persons inside the residence, the 
risk of destruction of evidence inside the house, and the belief that the 
occupants of [the defendant’s] residence were aware of the agents’ 
presence.”79 The Fifth Circuit found that the officers did not engage or 
threaten to engage in conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment by 
entering the second residence, even though the warrant  
listed the first residence.80  
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis ignores the obvious fact that the police 
could have avoided risks to officer safety and the possible destruction 
of evidence by not entering the incorrect house. Because the Supreme 
Court published King after the trial proceedings ended, the defendant 
did not raise the manufactured-exigency argument in his motion to 
suppress at trial.81 This timing may have affected the Fifth Circuit’s de-
cision, as it reviewed the district court’s denial of his motion under the 
more lenient plain error standard instead of under the de novo standard.82  
Despite these mitigating circumstances, decisions like Alba may 
encourage exploitative police work and could allow for ex post facto 
justifications of unlawful entries based on police or magistrate error.83 
 
77 Brief for the United States of America at 4-6, United States v. Alba, 439 F. App’x 
291 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-51019) (describing how investigators confused the addresses).  
78 Id. at 6. 
79 United States v. Alba, 439 F. App’x 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
80 Id. 
81 See id. 
82 Id. (“In considering a ruling on a motion to suppress . . . we review a district 
court's conclusions on Fourth Amendment issues de novo and its factual findings for 
clear error. . . . However, because Alba did not raise his manufactured-exigency argu-
ment in his motion to suppress, that issue is reviewed for plain error.” (citations omitted)). 
83 For a second example of questionable application of the King doctrine, see Unit-
ed States v. Hall, No. 11-60169-CR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133522, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 
16, 2011) (finding no police-created exigency where police covered the peep hole of 
the defendant’s door as they knocked, and did not identify themselves, despite defend-
ant’s contention that this action “made it more likely that [he] would approach the 
door armed based on a fear that robbers were at the door”). 
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Fortunately, such questionable applications of the King rule have been 
few and far between. 
B. Is King Confusing or Open to Abuse? 
Others have criticized the King decision as confusing or as ena-
bling law enforcement to circumvent the warrant requirement. This 
first criticism is somewhat valid, insofar as both courts and law en-
forcement may struggle to apply the King rule to new facts.84 However, 
the remaining critics misunderstand or oversimplify the Court’s holding. 
For example, King’s detractors have characterized the decision as 
“holding that in certain circumstances police may provoke exigent cir-
cumstances to justify a warrantless search.”85 But this criticism misin-
terprets King :  provoking an exigency is akin to creating the exigency, 
both of which the Fourth Amendment already proscribes. In reality, to 
intentionally provoke exigent circumstances, the police would have to 
demand entry or feign the existence of a warrant and threaten entry, 
giving the residents inside reason to believe entry was imminent and 
inciting them to attempt to destroy evidence. Such actions are viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment and are explicitly prohibited by King.86  
Other critics have read King to imply that when citizens refuse to 
respond to police requests for warrantless searches, they risk creating a 
King - supported exigency by their non-responsiveness: 
The sound of people moving around might indicate that they are about 
to destroy evidence but it also might mean that they are simply ignoring 
the police and going about their business. Moreover, had they remained 
perfectly still, the police might have inferred that they were steeling 
themselves to attack. This leaves answering the door as the only option 
 
84 See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing 
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 38 (2011) (“[P]olice can only rely 
on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search so long as they did not ‘violate 
or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency.’ To call this thicket 
a bright-line rule governing the entry of a home is an insult to lines (or brightness).” 
(quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011))). 
85 Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Re-
sponse to Professor Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 56 n.26 (2011) (emphasis added). 
86 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011) (reasoning that police would vio-
late the Fourth Amendment “by announcing that they would break down the door if 
the occupants did not open the door voluntarily”).  
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that does not create an exigency, but the Court went out of its way 
in King to say that one has a [sic] every right not to answer.
87 
However, King does not foreclose the option to ignore police. In 
fact, the Court explicitly recognized that, upon a request for entry to a 
home, “whether the person who knocks . . . is a police officer or a pri-
vate citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to 
speak.”88 Choosing not to speak gives no indication of imminent de-
struction of evidence and does not create sufficient exigency for po-
lice to enter a private residence without a warrant.  
King might pose a risk to citizens who, in response to a police 
knock, choose to move around in their home but do not destroy evi-
dence. Police may conflate the sounds of normal movement with an 
attempt to destroy evidence, as may have occurred in King itself.89 
However, the veracity of officers’ beliefs that sounds are consistent 
with the destruction of evidence is a factual matter to be determined 
by the trial court, and does not fall under the purview of the Supreme 
Court rule.90 In fact, on remand from the Supreme Court decision, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the sounds relied on by the 
officers in King to justify their entry “were indistinguishable from ordi-
nary household sounds, and were consistent with the natural and rea-
sonable result of a knock on the door.”91 The court vacated King’s 
conviction on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to 
“show something more than a possibility that evidence [was] being 
destroyed.”92 The Kentucky Supreme Court’s subsequent decision 
demonstrates that King provides a remedy when police enter a  
 
87 Michael J. Z. Mannheimer, Thoughts on Kentucky v. King, PRAWFSBLAWG  
(May 17, 2011, 2:31 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/ 
thoughts-on-kentucky-v-king.html. 
88 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (emphasis added). 
89 Id. (recognizing that the Kentucky Supreme Court had expressed doubt “as to 
whether the sound of persons moving [inside the apartment] was sufficient to establish 
that evidence was being destroyed” (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 
655 (Ky. 2010)) (alterations in original)). 
90 See id. at 1864 (remanding for further proceedings as to whether an exigency ex-
isted to justify a warrantless police search); see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 
(2002) (per curiam) (remanding for proceedings to determine whether exigent circum-
stances were present).  
91 King v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-SC-000274-DG, 2012 WL 1450081, at *3 
 (Ky. Apr. 26, 2012).  
92 Id. 
Levick.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  9/20/2012 1:19 PM 
2012] “Knock, Listen, Then Break the Door Down”? 15 
 
residence based on the mistaken and unreasonable interpretation of 
everyday noises as sounds indicating the destruction of evidence.  
C. Should King Have Adopted Another Test Altogether? 
Rather than critiquing the risks of confusion or exploitation created 
by the King decision, other critics have called for a different test alto-
gether. Lewis Katz argues that “[p]olice could have avoided the exi-
gency by not knocking on the door, concealing their presence while 
they called for a warrant” and that the exigency, therefore, “was entire-
ly police made and calls into question the entire doctrine of police-
created exigency.”93 In raising such a concern, Katz and other com-
mentators push for the adoption of the probable cause and time to 
secure a warrant test,94 which the King Court explicitly rejected.95 While 
securing a warrant may be preferable in some circumstances, requiring 
police to clear this hurdle in every circumstance unnecessarily restricts 
the options available to law enforcement and may result in the inter-
ruption of police investigations when immediate action is necessary.96 
In addition, the question of whether police possessed time to secure a 
warrant is subjective and fact-intensive; police, magistrates, and judges 
adjudicating claims may offer diverging interpretations of the amount 
of time required.97 Further, these critics fail to respond to the Court’s 
reasons for rejecting the probable cause and time to secure a warrant test 
in the first place, and their criticism of the King test is unpersuasive.  
Finally, one commentator has called for a new one-step doctrine, 
rejecting both the Court’s chosen test and those articulated by the 
 
93 LEWIS R. KATZ, OHIO ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5 (2012). See also King, 
131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for creating a rule 
whereby police may gain entry premised on an exigency, “nevermind that they had 
ample time to obtain a warrant”). 
94 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 (“The King Court rejects [the probable 
cause rule] on the ground that there may be good reasons for the police to opt instead 
for contact with the occupants of the suspect premises, but some of the reasons given 
by the Court seem rather thin.”). 
95 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (arguing that “[t]his approach unjustifiably interferes 
with legitimate law enforcement strategies”). 
96 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“Law enforcement of-
ficers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the mo-
ment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . .”). 
97 In rejecting the reasonableness test, the Court recognized that such a test would 
require “quantify[ing] the degree of predictability that must be reached before the 
police-created exigency doctrine comes into play,” and described the difficulties inher-
ent in making such a calculus. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859-60.  
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lower courts.98 This critic has argued that since “the police-created exi-
gency doctrine is just another variable in the holistic calculus of 
whether exigent circumstances existed,”99 the Court should have “in-
cluded police causation as part of its [holistic] exigent circumstances 
inquiry, [which] could have prevented manipulation of the rule, 
avoided interference with law enforcement, protected the privacy of 
the home, and ensured a more neutral analysis.”100  
But, as the author of this critique recognizes, the exigent circum-
stances calculus is already fact-intensive and requires a nuanced, holistic 
inquiry.101 Accordingly, to add another factor to the analysis, especially 
one as outcome-determinative as whether the police impermissibly 
created the exigency, would only serve to further complicate the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Ultimately, the reasonable time to secure a warrant test, along with 
the other tests examined and rejected by the Court, provide no more 
guidance or support to officers seeking to obey the Fourth Amend-
ment’s commands or to judges as they examine the validity of warrant-
less searches. Further, none of these tests are better than the King test 
at targeting the risk of police exploitation. By tying the demands of the 
test directly to the Fourth Amendment—rather than creating another 
nebulous or restrictive standard—the Court chose the option  
which best promulgates a relatively clear and concise statement of  
permissible police behavior.  
IV. THE KING STANDARD: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Despite its critics, the King decision is commendable, both for its 
consistency with past precedent and for its relatively clear guidance to 
police and courts.102 Nevertheless, “the application of King in all cases 
 
98 See The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, supra note 65, at 217-219 see also supra text ac-
companying notes 65-66 (summarizing this commentator’s criticism). 
99  See The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, supra note 65, at 218.  
100 Id. at 217. 
101 See id. (outlining the multitude of factors the Court has considered in determin-
ing whether a warrantless entry was reasonable based on an alleged exigency). 
102 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Choosing the Rule for Police-Created Exigencies in Kentucky v. 
King, SCOTUSBLOG (May 17, 2011, 7:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/05/ 
the-fourth-amendment-and-pragmatic-rulemaking/ (“[T]he Court’s method for choos-
ing a rule is notable. The Court’s opinion tries to work through the various possible 
tests to find a balanced and workable test to distinguish police-created from suspect-
created exigencies.”). 
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isn’t entirely certain,”103 and the lower courts must now confront the 
gaps in the doctrine. The test developed in King does not answer every 
question raised by the police-created exigency doctrine, and it pre-
sents a challenge to law enforcement officials and those seeking to 
protect personal privacy. Where police implicitly demand entry to a 
home, the doctrine does not make clear whether a resulting exigency 
would be police-created or not: 
[I]magine the police come to a home, knock on the door, and say, “This 
is the police! Open up!” The statement to “open up” is not a direct threat 
— the police didn’t say, “open up or else we will do X” — but it is a form 
of an order. A police order to take certain conduct may or may not count 
as a “seizure” of the person who is commanded to take the step. The cas-
es on that are actually quite unclear. . . . And even then, the seizure 
doesn’t occur until the person actually complies with the order. . . . So 
can the police yell to “open up”? It’s not clear.
104 
This concern was raised prior to the Court’s ruling in King105 and 
has served as a source of criticism since the decision.106 The Court ap-
peared to consider this possibility at oral argument, but chose not to 
use this case to resolve the issue.107 Owing to the subtleties involved in 
determining whether police threatened the occupant in King, the 
Court should have remanded the case for further proceedings on that 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (citations omitted). 
105 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Police-Created Exigent Circumstances in Kentucky v. King, SCO-
TUSBLOG (Jan. 5, 2011, 1:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/police-
created-exigent-circumstances-in-kentucky-v-king/ (“[T]he officers [in King] didn’t just 
knock and announce themselves: They knocked, announced their presence, and de-
manded to be let inside.”). 
106 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 (“The chilling message of King thus 
seems to be that threats to violate the Fourth Amendment are not verboten, at least if 
made with a modicum of subtlety.”). 
107 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) 
(No. 09-1272) (Alito, J.) (“[I]t might make a difference to me whether the police  
demanded entry prior to the time when the alleged exigent circumstances arose. And 
the only testimony on this point that I am aware of [is recorded in court documents] 
when police banged on the door as loud as they could and announced ‘Police, police, 
police.’”); id. at 44 (Sotomayor, J.) (“[T]here is something troubling about the police 
attempting to coerce entry as opposed to requesting entry, but . . . it’s not clear from 
this record which of the two the police did.”); id. at 53 (Scalia, J.)(“It wouldn’t techni-
cally be a Fourth Amendment violation, would it, if the police gave the impression that 
they had a warrant and were about to kick in the door? Is that a Fourth Amendment 
violation in and of itself?”). 
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point.108 The Court found no evidence in the record of a demand by 
the police amounting to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment, 
but stated that “if there is contradictory evidence [on that point] . . . , 
the state court may elect to address that matter on remand.”109 
Courts applying King have addressed the problem of explicit 
threats, but they have not yet confronted implicit threats.110 In addi-
tion, “[w]hether a threat did or did not occur will depend upon the 
exact words utilized by the police, and this is a matter likely to be a 
matter of dispute in a great many cases.”111 As such, in the event that 
an implicit demand case comes before the Court, it should take the 
opportunity to resolve this issue. In doing so, the Court must be careful 
not to undermine the clarity of the King rule. Until that day, lower 
courts applying King must engage in the holistic, “totality of the cir-
cumstances” analysis required in exigent circumstances cases, and de-
termine whether, on the facts of each case, a police officer’s actions 
amount to an unconstitutional threat or demand to enter. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the weaknesses in the doctrine and the plethora of criti-
cisms levied at the decision, King sets forth a bright line rule in a 
murky area of criminal law and is notable for its consistency with past 
precedent. As long as lower courts are vigilant in applying the test and 
in safeguarding citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights, King will protect the 
sanctity of Americans’ homes while allowing law enforcement the free-
dom required to investigate violations of the law efficiently and effectively. 
 
108 See Mannheimer, supra note 87 (arguing that the Court should have remanded 
the case for a determination whether police demanded entry). 
109 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2011). 
110 See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, No. 1:11-CR-101 TS, 2012 WL 2367992, at *6 
(D. Utah June 21, 2012) (“Here, the officers ‘threaten[ed] to engage in conduct that 
violates the Fourth Amendment’ when they attempted to enter the [hotel] room with 
the key card. Therefore, any destruction of evidence . . . was the result of police created 
exigency and cannot be considered by the Court.” (first alteration in original) (quoting 
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862)); People v. Cervantes, No. A131298, 2012 WL 2055106, at *6 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2012) (“[W]e do not agree with appellant that Officer DeJesus’ 
statement, ‘open the door,’ as officers knocked and identified themselves, constituted a 
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Wood, No. COA10-372, 2011 WL 
3891357, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (“They en-
tered the room with the permission of one of its occupants, Ms. Mills, using her room 
key. They did not threaten to enter without permission unless they were admitted.”). 
111 LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2011). 
Levick.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  9/20/2012 1:19 PM 
2012] “Knock, Listen, Then Break the Door Down”? 19 
 
 
 
 Preferred Citation: Rachel Levick, Case Note, “Knock, Listen, Then 
Break the Door Down”? The Police-Created Exigency Doctrine after Kentucky 
v. King, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 1 (2012), http://www.pennumbra 
.com/notes/09-2012/Levick.pdf. 
 
